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
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Social Freedom



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By Elsie Clews Parsons

The Family

Religious Chastity

The Old-Fashioned Woman

Fear and Conventionality

SOCIAL FREEDOM

A STUDY OF THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN
SOCIAL CLASSIFICATIONS AND
PERSONALITY

BY

ELSIE CLEWS PARSONS



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Social Freedom

SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION

THE modern Chinaman, however feminist he may be, cannot avoid referring to darkness or cold or the evil side of the world by the same word he uses for woman—all are *yin*. Nor can he write the idiograph for wrangling or intrigue without using the character for woman.² The classification once made by his ancestors is still binding, more binding than the bandages he is now removing from the feet of his daughters.

These Chinese examples of the persistence of the category of sex and of its spread over the irrelevant are particularly striking; they are not unique. To the Banks Islander whatever is long is male,

²Groot, J. J. M. de, *The Religious System of China*, Index, *Yin*. Leyden, 1892-1900. Ross, E. A., *The Changing Chinese*, p. 187. New York, 1911.

whatever short, female.¹ "Let your knowledge be feminine," was the early-Victorian counsel to girls.² The Hopi hold that the North, South, and the Above are male; the West, East, and the Below, female.³ Are not sun and moon, the waters and the earth, all things in nature, nature *herself*, are not all endowed by us with sex? In most languages gender has undisputed empire and language itself may be partitioned between the sexes—parts of it peculiar to women, parts to men. In Japanese there is a first person singular limited to the use of women.⁴

Classification by age is perhaps less conspicuous than classification by sex, and yet in fields already mentioned, in language and cosmology, the age category in its turn usurps a place. A precocious child may be told not to talk like his grandfather,

¹ Rivers, W. H. R., *The History of Melanesian Society*, vol. i., p. 91. Cambridge, 1914.

² Bennet, Rev. John, *Letters to a Young Lady*, p. 101. New York, 1824.

³ Fewkes, J. W., in *17th Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Ethn.*, pt. 2, pl. cxxxv., fig. 27, pp. 678-9; "Snake Ceremonials at Walpi," *J. Amer. Eth. and Archaeology*, vol. iv. (1894). "To the Hopi mind," Dr. Fewkes writes me, "everything has sex—earth, sky, rain, lightning; plants have sex (not in the Linnæan sense), etc."

⁴ Spencer, Herbert, *Sociology*, vol. ii., p. 155. New York, 1898.

using "grown up" words. "Lie" is an unbecoming word, we say, in a child's mouth, and, "baby talk" aside, there are nursery paraphrases for many simple acts or objects. As for the age of words themselves, that staunch conservative, Sir Frederick of Urbino, stands not alone in thinking that antiquity gives "grace and majesty" to language, and, compact of ancient words, a tongue is "more grave and more full of majestie, then of the newe."¹ With what emphasis Plato's spokesman corrects himself, we remember, in referring to the order of creation of the soul of the world and its body. The soul was made first, he asserts, for "never would God have allowed the elder to serve the younger." As for the creation of animate creatures, Timæus has no doubt that "women and other animals" were framed from men.² In the Jewish creation-myths, too, seniority seems to have been a factor in the subordination of the sexes and, in one version, of men and animals.³

¹ Castiglione, Baldassare, *The Book of the Courtier*, pp. 63, 65. London, 1900.

² *Timæus*, 34, 76.

³ Eve, to be sure, was created in both versions after the animals. That order has sometimes been improved upon. Richard Brath-

But in classifying men and animals seniority is not always a foremost principle. The animals may be accounted man's ancestors or his elder or younger brethren. Kinship is the principle of classification. In totemism the kinship category is seen spreading to the inanimate as well as to the animate. In cosmic myths sun and moon are brother and sister or the stars, their offspring. The earth is the great mother.

Classification by rank or occupation, generally speaking the category of caste, is widespread. The lion, it is said, is the king of beasts, or the bear or the serpent. The oak is the forest's king; the rose, queen of the flowers. Even the human body has been subject to this type of classification. The head is its lord, states Timæus, and because the front part of the body is more honourable than the back, man was given by his Creator a forward motion.¹ But for the spirit of caste should we not be sideling like the crab or backing like the sensitive plant! As for the place of caste in lan-

wait writes, for example, "Idleness maketh of men, women; of women, beasts; of beasts, monsters." (*The English Gentleman*, p. 17. London, 1641.)

¹ *Timæus*, 44, 45.

guage, it is well known that certain words or turns of speech are common or vulgar, others genteel or polite, others fit only for lackeys or fishmongers or court circles. There are even court dialects, and there is a language of the street.

Language, it hardly needs saying, is subject to categories other than that of age or of sex; it is dominated, for example, by the category of place-fellowship. The local group not only has its own tongue, it often lays a taboo on foreign tongues. The Ká-to and Kai Pomo women of California, for example, are forbidden to learn the other Pomo dialects; Spanish was once forbidden to French girls; French, to Spanish girls.¹ A man may be accounted an outlander, hence an enemy, by his speech. "You are a spy, you speak German," or "you speak English," is a common deduction in the present war. During the Reformation a belief circulated that whoso learned Hebrew became thereby a Jew.²

We have been glancing at certain irrelevancies

¹ Parsons, Elsie Clews, *The Old-Fashioned Woman*, p. 283. New York, 1913.

² Child, L. Maria, *Married Women*, pp. 132-3. New York, 1871.

of the social categories, noting their spread and the way the unrelated thing or circumstance has to contribute to them. Their compulsive, obsessive character is indeed notable. In early society they are not open to question—not even by social rebels. In early society there are criminals, there are even revolutionaries—both withal comparatively rare—but none is bent merely on escape from social classification. Even in modern society, where there is much shifting within each category and much friction, there is as yet little evidence of desire for freedom from the category itself. Humanism, if from a past culture we may borrow that term to designate the wholly modern social philosophy that would set personality free from the overbearing rule of age-class, of sex division, of economic or political class, of family or nation, —neo-humanism is still a far cry.

But it has been heard—and by many. Their conceptions of personality and of its needs become clearer and more definite, more vital and dynamic, through a study of the categories once so dominant. From them, from status, let us say, to personality is the rise in level our restless civilization is taking,

and the more we are cognizant of this change in level, the less bewildered shall we be by the heterogeneous movements around us and the faster, I surmise, shall we proceed.

Scientists have long since been aware of the dangers latent in classification, of the arrest to thought its rigidity causes. Moralists and publicists are less sophisticated.¹ To them, or rather to those among them who have never left the level of status for even a brief excursion to the level of personality, humanistic theory or adventure can be merely subjects for outcry. "What of respect for old age?" the institutionalist clamours, "or for women, what will become of chivalry? What will become of art or of the amenities of life? What will become of the children? Would you break up the family? Would you cast patriotism to the winds? and loyalty and honour?" Difficult indeed is it for those standing at different cultural levels to converse. The very words they use

¹ Witness, for example, the naïve assertions of Woodrow Wilson, Graham Wallas, and others that modern business has destroyed the *personal* relationship between employer and employee. To assume that such a relationship ever existed argues ignorance of caste psychology; a survival perhaps of the "natural man" speculation, and a failure to conceive of personal relationship in general.

have different meanings for them. Their sets of alternatives are not the same, nor their opposites. To change our figure, it is as if we circled about two centres, one the centre of status, the other the centre of personality. The circles overlap a little and in the common segment we may argue together, for the most part to disagree, but outside of the segment we do not even discuss or compare—each set of us aghast at the incoherencies of the other, at its impertinences, at its cruelties.

Against recriminations from the other circle one can undertake no defence. But against censure of another type, censure provokable by the following discussion, I would enter a plea. I foresee criticism for falling into the bad old trick of the evolutionist sociologist who so fondly described society as an organism, a subject for the biological laboratory. And yet I would not personify social categories, nor would I indulge in schematization, although, I admit, my verbal shortcuts may give at times both impressions. I wish merely to describe a habit of mind, a psychic tendency, that predisposition to classify which may be the source of disastrous failures as well as of great achievements.

AGE

IF you happened to be born in one of the seaside hamlets of southeastern New Guinea, you would find that all the boys or all the girls born about the same time were to be associated in set ways with you throughout life. A man, you will go hunting with your *kimta* mates or do irrigation work with them; a woman, you will go fishing with them. In general you will play the host to them, and on particular occasions you will eat with them—at small feasts, before going to war, on returning from communal hunts. When a *kimta* mate is dying, you will visit him; dead, you will wail for him and take part in digging his grave.¹

This grouping by age is particularly well defined among the natives of Bartle Bay, but it is not peculiar to them. The age-class is a world-wide institution. Everywhere contemporaries

¹ Seligmann, C. G., *The Melanesians of British New Guinea*, pp. 470-1, 614, 616. Cambridge, 1910.

flock or are thrown more or less deliberately together—they mess or sleep together, or form clubs or “societies,” or go to school or college together, or “come out” together, or go to war together, and, growing old together, they see to it that among other social boundaries those of age are duly observed.

For the age-classes keep or are kept apart. In New Guinea no young man would any more penetrate into the club-house of the old men without a special invitation than well brought up English children would venture unbidden into the drawing-room. Even in the same club-house or drawing-room reserve with one’s elders is a requirement of good breeding. Such good manners may be likewise but a proper precaution. “The vital airs of a young man mount upwards to leave his body when an elder approaches; but by rising to meet him and saluting he recovers them,” declares Manu,¹ the Hindu code-maker.

Manners commonly serve well enough as a barrier to intimacy. But preclusion of an intimacy

¹ *The Laws of Manu*, ii., 120. *The Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xxv.

between a man and a woman of different ages sometimes calls for even more effectual devices—for derision or for the assurance of mishap. The Masai who makes love to a woman of his father's age-class is cursed. If he is an old man and seeks a girl of his daughter's age-class, he is beaten by the other old men, his *kraal* pulled down, and his cattle slaughtered.¹ Among us such disparities between lovers are merely ridiculed. A woman who goes to extremes knows she will be called "an old man's darling" or "young enough to be his mother."

Do age-classes take up with or have imposed upon them peculiar habits, as is the way of segregated groups, or have our feelings and ideas about age merely tended to spread themselves out over life? Very inclusive, at any rate, the age category is. Not alone courting or mating is determined by age, but dieting, the use of stimulants or narcotics, ornament and dress, pastimes, employment, speech, posture, gait. Even the disposal of the deceased is affected by his age. Very often the corpses of infants are cast away without ceremony. Sometimes, contrariwise, they are entombed in the

¹ Hollis, A. C., *The Masai*, pp. 312, 313. Oxford, 1905.

dwelling, in a niche in the wall or under the hearth, their seniors resting in less homelike graves. Other funeral details vary with age. White crêpe instead of black, white flowers, a white coffin or hearse, these distinctions are suitable, we feel, for youth. Between juniors themselves, the Chinese once made distinctions. Those who died between nineteen and sixteen were buried in wooden coffins, outer and inner; the coffins of those between fifteen and eight were enclosed with brick; for those who died under eight no mourning was worn and they were put into earthenware coffins.¹

So recent and inadequate has been observation of the category of age as a sphere of influence, so to speak, that readjustments between age-classes have received little if any critical attention. Among primitive peoples, to be sure, readjustments are probably very rare—until the unsettling foreigner arrives. Then the prestige of the Elders is very apt to be sapped through the lessening of their political or religious control or, at least where the White Man is the encroacher, through the example

¹ *Lt Kt*, bk. ii., sec. 1, pt. 1, p. 12. *The Sacred Books of the East*, vols. xxvii., xxviii.

of a more untrammelled youth. "Formerly any old man would object to a boy smoking," a Pueblo Indian once remarked to me, "but nowadays, the boys, they don't mind." But among White Men conflict between the age-classes has been going on for some time. "Which was right, for the son to suit his ways to the father's or the father to the son's?" queries an elder in one of the plays² of Terence. I doubt if Terence would ever have put this question into the mouth of Chremes had there not been signs at large of rebellion, however incipient, on the part of Roman sons.

Centuries later, among the barbarians of the north, there occurred a not altogether unlike revolt, a revolt among daughters and, more especially, daughters-in-law. Slav girls began to break away from home and young Slav wives to demand homes of their own. The rule of the Elders was threatened. In Russia, in Rome, anywhere, the disintegration of the patriarchate is a blow to gerontocracy.

Although Slav peasants still believe that marriage without parental consent calls down the wrath of

² *The Self-Tormentor*, Act I.

Heaven, Christianity in itself lessened that parental control of marriage Roman law supported. Canon law made the consent of the marrying essential to the validity of marriage. Thanks to that principle, not to mention contributing factors, the practices of infant betrothal and marriage have passed altogether out of our culture, and today the sole anachronism left us is the law that parental consent is necessary in marrying below the age of consent at marriage.

However radical its provisions about contracting marriage, in dissolving it, canon law returned to its more wonted rôle, to backing up the Elders. The stand of the churches against divorce, their views of the indissolubility of marriage, are the outcome of the distress caused by dissociations and broken ties, a distress felt most deeply by the old and by them most guarded against. The increase of divorce among us is symptomatic of the waning influence not only of the churches, but of the Elders. It is in their despite that men put asunder what according to ancestral decision God has joined together.

The supernatural sanction is ever in the service

of the Elders. They are the interpreters of supernaturalism and its guardians; and every bit of territory lost to supernaturalism means to them a loss of authority and prestige. When plant or animal reproduction is no longer viewed as due to totemic magic, or placid seas or favourable weather, to the propitiation of the spirits of the waters or the skies, when the demand for charms for success in fishing or hunting, in fighting or lovemaking, lets up, and the like demand for prayer or amulet against disease or sudden death, against the dangers of travel or the shock of life's crises, then, in all this vast system of ecology, the Elders cease to be depended upon. Nowadays among us battleships are more effectual than war charms. The weather bureau is more trusted than the weather-wise, and the Marconi operator than the god of the tempest. Maps and charts and bulletins purvey the facts of wood and field and sea. Health and longevity we hope for through wholesome living. Courtship is largely an affair of personal charm or endeavour. We even wish for luck in general in a self-sufficient fashion with a glance at the new moon over our *own* right

shoulder. In luck, let alone in love or science, the Elders cut no figure.

The fate of the Elders is bound up with the fate of the gods, and for both the word, spoken or written, is the supreme instrument of power. But in the written word there lurks for the supernaturals and their representatives or guardians a danger. As soon as the arts of writing and reading cease to be hieratic secrets, they promise opportunities to youth for independence. Although scholastic education continues for long periods in the grip of the Elders, little by little their hold is shaken. Education secularized, in course of time not even of lay teachers is an advanced age required. Comparatively recent graduates are serving today as lecturers and even as trustees in the universities. In the learned professions in general senescence has ceased to be a necessary qualification. Would any girl today write in her journal on meeting an agreeable young doctor: "He has not conquer'd the antipathy I bear a young physician—or rather a *young doctor*?"¹ The girl of a century ago could

¹ *A Journey to Ohio in 1810*, p. 50. *Yale Historical Manuscripts*, vol. i. New Haven, 1913.

not bring herself even to call a young man a physician!

The prejudice against younger men overcome, their work may be compared on its merits with that of their seniors. From that comparison to the view that senescence may disqualify is but a step. The next step is retirement for age—a step already taken in modern states for the judges of the law, if not for its makers—and then, where both compassion and clear thinking obtain, the old age pension.

If that social laggard, the law, has had a voice in the downfall of the Elders, we may be sure that many other factors have worked towards establishing at large the theory of superannuation. That respect and reverence for age has indeed been on the decrease none will dispute,—the quarrel has been whether or not the decrease is a sign of degenerate times, whether or not those states which are the most excellent in their morals are, as Cicero¹ and many others have alleged, the most scrupulous in honouring the aged.

However that may be, let us note that our grow-

¹ *De Senectute*, xviii.

ing disrespect for the Elders is not of itself an attempt at emancipation from the category of age. It may be merely a shifting of factors within the category, the rule by the old merely yielding to a rule by the young. The very vehemence of the prejudice against senescence, the concealment of grey hairs, perhaps even the unfailing joke about the woman who will not tell her age, all suggest that the category of age is quite as obsessive as ever. And yet there are signs of its restriction.

For the first sign we have to travel back a way. It lies, I take it, in the emergence of birthdays.¹ A birthday is inevitably somewhat of an individual affair. Its ceremonial,² of course, like all ceremonial, is collective, moved by collective feelings, expressive of tradition and collective points of view. But birthday ceremonial does direct attention to the individual, rather than to his group. To be sure it may point to the inclusion of the individual in his age group,³ thereby making of

¹ Among the Greeks before the eighth century B.C. (Schmidt, Wilhelm, *Geburstag im Altertum*, p. 8. *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, vol. vii., No. 1, Giessen, 1908.)

² Somewhat of a magic ceremonial, I surmise, to prolong life.

³ Quite conspicuously it does this in China. Chinese birthdays

itself an acceptable link with the earlier age-class system. Nevertheless, despite its transitional nature, birthday ceremonial is revolutionary. It makes possible the disintegration of the age-class.

But birthdays are themselves falling into disesteem. Except for the very young often they are not celebrated. They are even slurred over. Away from officialdom it is bad form to ask one his age, and is not a man as old as he feels, a woman as old as she looks? a formula if not conversationally happy, at any rate, like most conversational formulas, of some sociological import. The other day, lapsing into a moment when such formulas take possession, I asked the age of one just referred to in our conversation. "Oh, the age everyone is," answered my collocutor, "the age you don't think of, neither very young nor very old." The age, he might have added, when no one keeps your birthday.

The passing of birthdays has been a consequence

are not celebrated with much *éclat* until the age of fifty. Then and every ten years afterwards the celebration of "making ten" is an affair of much expense and pomp. (Doolittle, J., *Social Life of the Chinese*, vol. ii., pp. 217-20. New York, 1865.)

in part of the atrophy of the principle of seniority. Were it not for the persistence of primogeniture in England or the fag system or the stray claims of seniors in other conservative circles, in the nursery, let us say, or on the college campus, it would be hard for us today to realize the importance seniority may take on. It has postponed the marriage of many girls besides that fair Biancha who was compelled by her father to wait uncourted until her elder sister was bespoken. Outside of Shakespeare's Padua, among many peoples, getting married is a matter of precedence in the family. So compelling is the rule among the Mordvins of Finland that parents do not object to a younger daughter becoming an unmarried mother.¹ For a man to marry before his elder brother was in the eyes of the ancient Hindus a crime.² But outside of marriage or of the inheritance of place or property or of the numberless ways it tells in family life, seniority counts for much—it counts between acquaintances. Take the Chinese or the Greek. A Chinaman must not only walk behind

¹ Abercromby, John, "Marriage Customs of the Mordvins," *Folk-lore*, vol. i. (1890), p. 418.

² *Manu*, xi., 61.

his senior, he must look in the same direction; sitting in the presence of his senior he must keep a watch on his own countenance; nor may he introduce into their talk any fresh topic of conversation¹—all particulars Plato might well have taken as illustrations of his own generalization that “what is older is honoured in no small degree beyond what is younger.”²

Illustrations of this attitude in our own contemporaneous society are, to be sure, rare, definite illustrations. The age-class has disintegrated; seniority is becoming insignificant in practical ways. And yet in spirit the attitude is still preserved—largely, shall we say, as an outcome of orientation. Standing in a common segment of society, the segment holding the facts of immaturity, maturity, and decay, our attitude varies with the way we face. Are we in that circle of society whose centre is personality or in that whose centre is institutionalism or status? In the one, the helplessness or inadequacy of childhood or old age inspires us with pity and a desire for service; in

¹ *Lt Kt*, bk. i., sec. i., pt. ii., 21; pt. iii., 10.

² *The Laws*, ix., 16.

the other, with some pity, perhaps, but with a desire for control or subjugation. In the one, we seek to enlarge the opportunities life offers youth and to minimize the handicaps it puts upon age. In the other, we check and thwart both the young and the old. We bully them. We take pleasure in the mystification and apprehensiveness natural to their ignorance or incompetence. Their inhibitions we encourage. The more bewildered and timid they are, the more subject they become, the more dependent. In the circle of personality we do not always think of children or old people as children or old people. Whenever it is possible we treat them as of our own age, whatever that may be, that is as of no particular age. We forget the whole attribute of age until some demand upon us for compassion or tolerance or service recalls it to us. In the circle of status we are ever insistent upon the manifestations of age, never do we forget them, never do we let either the young or the old escape their age. I recall in a gallery of the Louvre a sculpture of youth and age, a blind man carrying on his back an aged paralytic. This group, it seems to me, is not merely a sym-

bolism of the weakness of age and the blindness of youth, it is an expression of the untiring self-assertiveness of the mature, of the age-class dominant and domineering today.

SEX

~~TO us and probably to all peoples sex is quite as~~
~~definite and dominant a category as age.~~

It is quite as ambitious, our sense of it as imperative, so imperative that, as in our treatment of age, every detail of life (and of death) becomes an opportunity for formalized expression—ornament and dress, food and drink, occupations, gait, posture and gesticulation, cries and language, laughter and tears, innumerable particulars of manners and morals.

Like age, too, sex makes for social segregation. ~~The sexes, like the age-classes, are seclusive or exclusive. In endless ways men will have nothing to do with women or women, with men.~~ Each sex has always kept a great deal to itself, avoiding the other, shy, apprehensive. In general the separation has been practically contrived by the rule that woman's place is in the home, or a subdivision of it, and man's place, outside, in the world, in inter-

ests and occupations not open to women. In public places the presence of women has been forbidden or unwelcomed, covert or ignored. Of course the circumstances vary. In certain New Guinea tribes during times of religious excitement the village is deserted by the women; they have to take to the woods. With us it is the woods, sometimes men say, which are no place for women. The streets of Seoul were once taboo to women by day; there are streets in New York once taboo to them at night. Once in England ladies went to the play wearing masks, today they sit in the House of Commons behind a grill. "Through a lattice made of bamboo and a sort of silken net, they see and hear all that passes without being seen themselves," writes a traveller of the accommodation made for ladies at Chinese banquets two or more centuries ago.¹

The opinion of these Chinese ladies is not available, but Englishwomen will tell you that they find the arrangement of the ladies' gallery a grateful protection.

¹ Astley, Th., *Voyages and Travels*, vol. iv., p. 83. London, 1747.

Their satisfaction with it, their feeling that it is a safeguard against the men below them, is in part an expression, I take it, of that sex antagonism not uncommonly manifest in more direct ways in primitive society. In Australia, for example, in tribes where each sex has its own totem, men and women will fight together, men with their clubs, women with their digging sticks, whenever their totem bird or bat has been killed by one of the other sex.¹ The creature may have been attacked in a spirit of mischief or malice, in much the same spirit boys shy stones at an old maid's cat.

Now and again one sex or the other frankly avows that its exclusiveness or seclusiveness is a matter of discrimination in its own favour. We remember how Livy puts in the mouth of Cato the Elder a caution against letting women have their own way. "Suffer them once to arrive at an equality with you," he warns, "and they will from that moment become your superiors." American housewives are given to saying that they for their part do not like to have men hanging all day about

¹ Howitt, A. W., *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, pp. 148-51. London and New York, 1904.

the house. It upsets their housekeeping. The Ainu of Japan admits that women are kept ignorant of sacred things lest they turn their prayers against the men.¹ Less than a century ago it was at times thought rather unsafe in the Episcopalian hierarchy to permit women to hold separate missionary meetings. "You never can tell," said one clergyman who attended every session of the women of his church, "you never can tell what these women will take it into their heads to pray for next."²

But in these expressions of sex antagonism we must see mere suspicion and apprehensiveness, the feelings which readily arise between any segregated groups. There is here nothing but a desire to keep the sex boundaries undisturbed, no sign at all of a desire to cross them. For that one must turn to the fabled Amazons or to those buoyant spirits of the Renaissance by whom more than one aphorism of sex was questioned.

Renaissance challenges of sex distinctions bore fruit in the nineteenth century in that struggle

¹ Batchelor, J., *The Ainu and their Folk-lore*, pp. 550-1. London, 1901.

² *The Woman's Journal*, May 29, 1915.

for sex mobility Huxley and fellow "philogynists" called emancipation and we of a later period, feminism. In its most obvious aspects this great sex adventure is an agitation against the exclusiveness of men. In regard to the exclusiveness of women the movement has as yet taken no destructive position, rather has it from time to time countenanced or even encouraged that invidious spirit, the very spirit most characteristic of the ardent woman hater. "As women," declares the Woman's Peace Party in the preamble of its platform, "as women, we feel a peculiar moral passion of revolt against both the cruelty and the waste of war." Seldom have men been more exclusive.

There has been no concerted protest of feminists against sex segregation, but individual voices have been raised—sometimes because the very admission of women into men's fields necessitates association with men, an association in itself regarded as an indifferent or even an unfortunate circumstance; sometimes because of the theory that co-operation is truly desirable, the sexes through their differences supplementing one another; sometimes contrariwise, because sex, it is

believed, does not enter into the co-operation at all—only personality. Let men and women associate as personalities, it is urged, not merely as sexes. It is just because their intercourse has been surcharged with sex in the past that feminist propaganda is needed.

Very pregnant is this charge by the feminist of oversexing, and highly significant the analysis it prompts. Freedom from the domination of personality by sex is the gift *par excellence* of feminism, a gift it brings to men as well as women, and not only to men as men but to men in their relation to women. As long as women are *the sex*, preoccupation with sex being to such a degree undisturbed, personality has little chance to enter into sex relations. A woman, a man too,¹ is a personification of sex,² not a personality in whose

¹ The plea against treating men merely as men has certainly been less vociferous and persistent than that against treating women merely as women, but it was made earlier. Years before the publication of *The Doll House*, an American writer recommended to young ladies "always, when conversing with gentlemen, to endeavour to think of them as human beings, and to forget other distinctions." (Coxe, Margaret, *The Young Lady's Companion*, p. 53. Columbus, 1846.)

² I cannot forbear giving the illustration at this moment under my eye. "The nearer you approach to the masculine in your apparel," writes the Rev. John Bennet, "the further you will

nature sex plays but a part. Towards him or her as a personification, set duties are owing; over him or her, set rights are enforcible. In so far as he or she is husband or lover, wife or mistress, the collective, institutional attitude is easy, the line of least resistance, involving an adjustment once and for all, certain, reassuring. He or she has but to be considered as a member of a class, a class towards which a given attitude is assumed or presupposed.

Any shirking of this attitude or violation of the standardized feelings or ideas it implies is condemned or penalized by society as an offence against itself, or, from a modern standpoint, against those prescriptions it established for the sexes at a period of culture when only an economic or a sexual relation between them was ever considered. Offences between men and women as personalities, offences or obligations, are not taken into account in the primitive institution of marriage or, in that institution of the less primitive

recede from the appropriate graces and softness of your sex. . . . We forget that you are woman in such a garb, and we forget to love." (*Letters to a young Lady*, p. 142.)

cultures, prostitution. Relations other than economic or sexual do not figure. If ever they compel attention, if personal relations enter into marriage or prostitution, anti-institutional conduct is imminent, and if such conduct is not entirely suppressed by the group, "sex problems," as we call them, arise.

At first these problems appear not as questions of personality but as conflicts in the status of the sexes. The sex problems of the nineteenth century were concerned with the property rights of married women, the double standard of sex morals, the rehabilitation of the old maid, all changes in status, or with the difficulties of passing from one sex status to another,—the trials of the woman with a past, of the divorcée,—or with the propriety even of separate social compartments for the unmarried and the married, for the married and the prostitute. The contract for lifelong support was compared, and sometimes even unfavourably, with the contract for shorter periods.

In this century the orientation of the problems of sex relationship is changing. In mating, responsiveness or reciprocity takes the place of

proprietorship. Since mating and parenthood are seen to be theoretically¹ distinguishable, is not any relation of sex, we are asking, to be self-determining, arising and developing according to the nature of the lovers themselves, not to be determined by or in the interests of others, the only test of the relationship, the effect of the one personality upon the other?

Other questions, profound and subtle, are arising from this shifting of interest in sex relations. Sympathy and insight are called upon in measure undreamed of by the antique moralist whose sole anxiety is to preserve his reassuring social categories intact. The marriage law and custom he finds so satisfactory, divorce law, laws about seduction or adultery or bigamy, estimates of prostitution, the law of parental consent to marriage, all are matters certain to demand readjustment when mating comes to be considered for itself. Parental consent, one may forecast, will disappear, the age

¹ Practically, the increase of lifelong celibacy, of late marriage, of childless marriage, has led up to the making of this distinction. The introduction of contraceptives has made its acceptance inevitable. (See Parsons, Elsie Clews, "Marriage and Parenthood—a Distinction," *The International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1915.)

of consent at marriage becoming the legal age at majority, maturity the only age-criterion for mating. Prostitution will be thought of as a sin against sex on the part of men as well as women, a greater sex sin in men in fact than in women, the part of women in it being economic rather than sexual, and the discrimination against women prostitutes being in reality a caste discrimination.² As for single-heartedness in mating, under free circumstances the single-hearted will seek his or her like, as will he or she of polygamic tendency. One foresees an increase of monogamous unions. One foresees too in mating a far larger measure of candour and frankness. With reciprocity as the paramount principle in sex relationships, many of the reasons for covertness will disappear. Seduction will be redefined as deception on the part of either man or woman as to what he or she asks of the other or offers.

There will be more sincerity, less sentimentality. Change as it comes will be met, not lied about or shirked. Life is change and any live personal

² Cp. Parsons, Elsie Clews, *The Family*, pp. 347-48. New York and London, 1906.

relation is a changing relation. And so the principle of permanence will cease to be the final criterion of virtue in mating. It will lose its very egregious place. Lasting love will be esteemed a good, like lasting health or energy or happiness. But, as in health or happiness, the enduring character of passionate love will not be considered solely of itself, will not be its justification, as it were, for existing. The surcease of love will be accounted a disaster, a tragedy, not an offence; a misfortune society should regret or pity, not condemn or revile.

Whatever fresh measure of sympathy given sex relations, however the new sex questions are answered, it will be realized that relations between personalities, whether sex enters into them or not, run the risk, given publicity, of becoming impersonal and monopolistic, that personal relations cannot be standardized, that each relationship, if considered at all, will have to be considered in itself. But would such a task be possible, we may well ask, for collective thought or action? Recognizing its limitations, will not society begin to regard sex relations as purely private relations, no

more its business than friendships? In early culture, friendship, we are to see, is itself an affair of covenant and ceremonial, a public relationship. With us it is not a community concern. Time will be, one ventures to predict, when the sex relationship likewise will come into its rights to privacy, to freedom from direct community control.

Again standing in the circles of status and of personality, standing in their common segment of sex, as we face towards status, we see sex differences a cause of apprehension and alarm, a reason for separating the sexes as completely as possible—physically and psychically. All intrusions of one sex upon the other sex are fearful and hateful, to be precluded by the utmost ingenuity, by social devices of all kinds, by supernatural, moral, and legal sanctions. Sex consciousness is encouraged to spread out over non-sexual things or circumstances; it expresses itself in quite irrelevant habits, it is given all manner of fanciful associations. When the sexes do meet, the conditions are carefully planned, planned for the most part by the Elders and planned to suit their convenience.

Feeling but little the impulses of sex, the Elders deprecate them, belittle and degrade them. Courtship and marriage custom, the practice of periodic license or of prostitution are determined by the Elders to suit themselves, or at most, as compromises with the cravings of youth. The "good of society" in sex relationships generally means the good of the Elders, of those to whom the intimacies of sex are distasteful and change in sex relations, vexatious.¹

Facing towards personality, the aspects of sex are very different. Sex becomes a factor in the enrichment of personality and of contacts between personalities. It is a factor, not an obsession. It counts only where it really exists, but there it is free to really count. No longer a source of distress or annoyance, it is not kept separate from life nor repressed into the obscene. It is free to express itself, developing its own tests, standards, ideals. According to these ideals, relations between men and women will be primarily personal relations, secondarily sexual. The standards set

¹ *Cp.* Parsons, Elsie Clews, "Sex and the Elders," *New Review*, May 1, 1915.

them will be standards of frankness, sincerity, single-heartedness, and above all of reciprocity. That these standards can be lived up to best in a private, anti-monopolistic relationship will be realized or realized enough to free sex relations from compulsory advertisement or from the necessity of furtiveness. Then at last, assured of privacy and of freedom, passionate love will forget its shameful centuries of degradation to spread its wings into those spaces whereof its poets sing.

KIN

THE revolt of the sons, the revolt of the daughters and, in the latter end, the revolt of the parents—what does it mean? That blood is no longer thicker than water or that a man's clan is not really indicated, as certain Melanesians think,¹ in the lines of his palm? Or does it mean perhaps that Plato's dream for the continuance of the race is coming true?

The philosopher substituted other agencies for the family, the age-class and the state, substitutes modern society likewise favours. Day nursery, school, "summer camp," factory, hospital, and "home," all these agencies, public and private, are making of the modern family a more and more dispensable group, economically and culturally. But in Plato's time and, I surmise, in all time, the family is more than an economic unit or a medium

¹ Rivers, *The History of the Melanesian Society*, vol. i., p. 251.

to perpetuate a miscellany of habits or customs. The family has gratified in unequalled measure the craving for status relationships so urgent in the hearts of primitive people. It has supplied set forms of companionship unhampered by personal intimacy. It has imparted a sense of participation not only with itself, but with life generally, giving guaranties against disturbance of the existing order. In family life, personality with its inevitable recognition of change, the unfixed, fleeting spirit for lack of another name we call personality, has no place. It is in fact anathema.

When Plato substituted age-class or state for the family, when the tribal interest anywhere has dominated the interest of blood relationship, when we ourselves encourage or suffer the inroads of school or asylum, one kind of status relationship is merely taking the place of another. There is no novelty in that movement or threatened upheaval. It does not alarm us. Nor when we cry out nowadays in fear for the future of the family is it from any real apprehension of institutional encroachment. The intrusion we fear, albeit too blindly to recognize, is the intrusion of personality.

But if the family disintegrates as we forebode, it will be due to that very fear. It will be due to failure to heed the modern demand that personality enter into all social relations, even into those in the past most hostile to personality, the familial relations.

It is asking a great deal of the family to meet this demand, an inner revolution. [So much of family life is standardized and prescribed, the services of relatives, the time and place and nature of their intercourse, their reciprocal emotions. Conversation in the family is so apt to be stereotyped; greetings, inquiries, jokes, farewells, formalized; formulas of sympathy or interest expected or demanded. Then there are so many family taboos, so great an insistence in the family upon conformity, so ruthless a use of ridicule to secure it. The ceremonial characteristic of family life in times of crisis—at birth, at death, at betrothal or marriage, this ceremonial, or the sentimental attitude which more or less substitutes for it in our modern society, would of itself preclude or check personal spontaneity and personal influence.

The kinship category is embodied, of course, like the categories of age and sex, in groups. These groups have considerable variation, the single family, the compound family, the clan, the tribe, the possession of a common ancestor being perhaps the only character common to all the groups. Descent itself is reckoned through the maternal or paternal line or through both. In certain totemic clans or in tribes like the Latin or the Greek the common ancestor is got through magical fortuities of impregnation, or through myth. Within these kinship groups there have been conflict and change. Descent has been shifted from the maternal to the paternal line; the joint family has encroached upon the individual family or the individual family upon the joint, the functions of clan or tribe have grown or shrunk out of sight, completely out of sight among us except for singularities of inheritance or lingering restrictions upon the marriage of cousins, except too perhaps for genealogical organizations like the Colonial Dames or the Sons or Daughters of the American Revolution. The acclaiming of George Washington as the father of his country can only be regarded as a

highly abortive attempt to acquire an eponymous ancestor.

On the whole, the importance of having ancestors has unquestionably dwindled in modern society. The influence of the kinship category over much irrelevant to kinship is also passing. In primitive society marriage choices are very largely determined by ideas about the bounds of kinship, the prevailing endogamous or exogamous restrictions corresponding to those bounds. A whole community may be divided into exogamous moieties, or A may be sold or given in marriage to B because B is or is not a cousin or a clanfellow. Incest, whatever its definition, is always the most heinous of offences. With a division of labour more elaborate than that between the sexes or the age-classes, occupation is often a kinship concern. Young people are apprenticed to their senior relatives or inherit from them their economic or professional properties or secrets. Occupations may be even taboo to those who would enter upon them by other than familial paths. "The physic of a doctor," according to the *Lî Kî*, "in whose family medicine has not been practised for three genera-

tions at least, should not be taken."¹ In China a doctor had indeed to inherit his father's practice. Totemic practices may also be passed on in the family, and secrets and rites of magic and religion. Political as well as religious offices are hereditary. A child is not only "baptized" in the religion of his fathers, he joins their political party. His habitat is fixed too by birth. He spends his life in the hamlet or country he was born in. Even his friends may be chosen for him by his family.² Marriage, occupation, religion, politics, neighbourhood, friendship, all are determined or greatly effected by kinship.

In many other particulars kinship counts. Take food. Where totemism prevails it is generally a wickedness to eat your totem ancestor, however appetizing an animal or nutritious a plant he may be. About to die, a Kikúyu father lays down for his offspring rules for their diet the rest of their life, giving these family rules the sanction of his dying curse, *ki-rú-me*.³ A Toda

¹ Bk. i., sec. ii., pt. iii., 1.

² See pp. 85, 86.

³ Routledge, W. S. and K., *With a Prehistoric People*, p. 21. London, 1910.

does not feast on the day of the week his father died.¹ Fasting for a set period is a common observance in mourning for relatives. Still more generally mourning involves rules for ornament and dress. In fact at death the sense of kinship is apt to spread over the whole of life, its spirit of possessiveness unresisted by the mourners and, since it serves to segregate them, favoured by outsiders. To outsiders a mourner is troublesome, a *trouble-fête*, and so it is generally held to be unseemly for people in mourning to go into society, unseemly or, wherever the feeling about death infection is particularly marked, inconsiderate and wanton.

Mourning is a veritable storehouse of primitive theory and practice of which family seclusiveness is one of many expressions. The spirit of family seclusiveness or exclusiveness may show itself on the occasion of a birth. I once spent the evening in the house of a woman in labour. Her mother was there too and months later my friend told me that her mother had been offended and not a little incensed by my presence. It was contrary to

¹ Rivers, W. H. R. *The Todas*, pp. 405, 407. London, 1906.

native custom—she came from Boston—to have an outsider present at such a time. In many savage tribes none may be present at childbirth but an elderly female relative.

Apart from crises in daily life kinship is also exclusive. In many communities you may not belong to two families at the same time. Adoption or marriage may entail a more or less complete break with the family you were born or grew up in. If in spite of marriage the blood ties hold, the marriage ties themselves may break. So strong was the family feeling of the exogamous Haida Indians, we are told, that a man would not hesitate to betray his wife to death, or a woman, her husband, for the good of his or her clan.^{*} Among us family interference is the cause, if not commonly of murder, not uncommonly of divorce, and to marry into a large family is considered somewhat of a drawback. Friendship as well as matrimony may suffer from the exclusive spirit of caste. Within a generation or two in Montenegro you could not be the friend

^{*} Swanton, J. R., "Contributions to the Ethnology of the Haida," p. 62, *Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.*, vol. v. Leyden, 1905-9.

of one to whom you were not related¹; unrelated, you were ever a potential enemy. And so it must ever be in regions where the blood feud characterizes family solidarity—in African tribes, among the Arabs, in the Kentucky mountains.

In less primitive parts of this country hereditary enmities are very rare. He with whom your father is not on speaking terms may be "a particularly good friend" of yours. Juliet today has little need to ask her Romeo to doff his name. Among us sex relations in general are after all but little restricted by kinship. Only within the narrowest of family circles is sex intimacy accounted incest. Outside of the countries governed by the Code Napoleon, parental control of marriage is slight, and family influence in winning a bride or a bridegroom, negligible. As for family influence on occupation, it may aid in getting a job, but the nature of the job is but little determined by parents—determined directly I mean, indirectly it is of course determined, since membership in an eco-

¹ Durham, M. E., "Some Montenegrin Manners and Customs," *The Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. xxxix. (1909), p. 89.

conomic class affects the education parents can afford their children. Although religious faith, patriotism, and political partisanship are still greatly subject to the influence of the nursery, some degree of choice is left the individual apart from the inclinations of his family. He *may* differ from his mother in religion, from his father in politics. He *may* leave home, he *may* expatriate himself.

Emigration is a potent factor in severing kinship associations. Besides the actual partings it involves, it is apt to affect the relations between those who emigrate together, particularly between the different generations. The younger assimilate more easily and quickly with the new group than the older and therefore, feeling independent or "superior," chafe against their control and readily revolt. It is no mere coincidence that the land of the immigrant is not a stronghold of the family. To the making of the precocious, "spoiled" American child, migration, both immigration and change of home within the country, may have contributed not a little.

Whatever the causes, indifference to seniority and appreciation of the younger generation at the

expense of the older are hard on the family. Unsupported by its ancient ally, the age-class of the Elders, a class too far gone to be of service,¹ its sphere of influence cut down, limited to the narrow group of two generations and its natural rights² and capacities³ challenged even within those confines, we may well ask what part in modern life is there left for the family to play? The part of a worsted, outworn conservative, a sorry, dissipated complainant? That indeed is the part commonly assigned it by its most zealous supporters.

But what if the conservative one turn right about face and play the game of life in the modern spirit, what chance of survival will it then have, what place may it take? Suppose the family makes of itself a centre for personal contacts, a

¹ Its passing within the family has been referred to by one old lady as "the grandmother's tragedy." (*The Autobiography of an Elderly Woman*, p. 158. Boston and New York, 1911.) We shall all agree, I suppose, that grandparents are not what they once were.

² It is a bold because an ignorant parent who claims a right to his or her "own child" nowadays. "It's my child, isn't it?" has ceased to be a justification for questionable behaviour.

³ In the face of our societies to counsel or educate mothers, what woman would dare appeal to her "instinct" any longer as qualifying her to bring up her child?

meeting place for all ages and for both sexes, without discrimination against youth or age, without prejudice of sex, a meeting place for those whose difference in earning capacity is to be disregarded, and where the privilege of feeling "I have never to take my work home with me" is not limited to one member. Suppose this centre becomes a backer of the spirit of neighbourhood and of the spirit of friendship, foregoing with its oldtime solidarities is oldtime jealousies. And suppose, to accomplish this position, the family realizes that the utmost individual privacy and freedom are essential; that to all, conditions making for the fullest personal expression have to be secured; that spontaneity and responsiveness are the criteria of its success as a group? Suppose it realizes that within the family circle none must be kept reluctant or unwilling, none who would leave it either once and for all or merely from time to time; that to this end of freedom of association the composition of the family group must be conceived of as elastic, variable with the variations in personal relations. Suppose these aims become the characteristic ambitions of the family? What then?

With heart set on becoming the unique champion of personality, its guardian against immaturity or decrepitude, against the ready encroachment of passionate love, against the specializing effects of occupations, because of all these pitfalls its peculiar guardian and champion, truly a future of great import awaits the family—if it be discerned.

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CASTE

BEFORE feminism began to utter its sporadic protests against the category of sex, the category of caste was arraigned. But not so very long before. "A man's a man for a' that" was not written until 1795. Despite his liberalism, the founder of Christianity was an acceptor of caste. "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's," did he not counsel? Even the revolutionaries of the eighteenth century fought not for freedom from political class but for a political status unhampered by overlord or by king overseas.

Very ancient is the class struggle. A long procession of historic figures has passed—Roman plebeians off in the Alban Hills on a general strike, English barons giving fame to a little marsh called Runnymede, English peasants extracting a promise from their boy king that never again they be named or held as serfs, American negroes escaping to the

great swamp of Virginia or, in later years by the underground railway, to the north, low caste Hindus taking to Islam or Christianity as an escape from utter poverty and ignominy, Russian terrorists taking to bomb or bullet as a relief for distress of soul,—Sophia Perovskaia, Vera Figner, Vera Zassulitch, Diderot, Danton, Tom Paine, Jefferson, last of all George Sorel and Émile Pouget, Haywood and Tom Mann, belated preachers of a class consciousness curiously anachronistic in our modern world.

They are dramatic figures, these protesters against the oppression of class by class. They are portentous too of a larger freedom than ever they dreamed of. More significant, however, are those humbler and more obscure figures, anonymous for the most part, few and very scattering before the past century or two, now a compact host, those restless, ambitious spirits who cross the boundaries of class, passing from class to class for varying lures, for wealth, for love, for glamour. Time was that whatever their eagerness or effort, the barriers to their passing were well nigh insuperable. The Egyptian warrior who engaged in aught

but war broke the law.¹ In imperial Rome, the guildsman who entered army or church was ordered back to his guild; the curial who sought the Palatine service or senatorial position, back to his municipality, the fugitive colonus was restored to his master's estate.² The English serf in search of trade or hire was outlawed; a runaway labourer was branded on the forehead with hot iron. The English universities closed their gates to villeins. A peasant child was forbidden apprenticeship in a town. As late as the middle nineteenth century there were English squires who objected to the peasantry learning to read or to figure. Were we not told a decade or two ago that a high school education or educational "frills" only made pupils dissatisfied with their station in life? And is not the ambition of the new vocational education sometimes prostituted into a method for the fixation of caste?

The possibility of dissatisfaction with the station you are born to is not even entertained in many

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, 24.

² Dill, Samuel, *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, pp. 234, 256, 281. London, 1910.

societies. Does a Brahman ever dream of being ~~anything~~ but a Brahman? And in India, once a ~~fisherman~~ or a barber, always a fisherman or a ~~barber~~, or whatever your father was.¹ Even where ~~people~~ think themselves freer than the castemen of India to choose their jobs, passing from one kind of occupation to another is fairly difficult. The clerk hesitates to become an artisan; the priest, a merchant; the merchant, an actor. A jack of all trades is taunted with being master of none. A rolling stone is a term of reproach; an unfrocked priest, an insult.

This immobility may be at times due to the fear, as we say, of coming down in the world; but it is also caused by a reluctance to part from old associates and forego old habits. The break must be so thorough. You cannot combine two professions or trades either in India or in this country. Your trade-union or your caste headmen will not suffer it; it is contrary to professional honour or etiquette. An American lawyer who writes a

¹ Unless the change can be made collectively and a new caste formed. The Madhunapit are barbers who became confectioners, the Chasadhobas, washermen who took to agriculture. (Risley, Herbert, *The People of India*, p. 76. Calcutta and London, 1908.)

novel must publish it anonymously. A Secretary of State damages his reputation when he goes on the road. A stock exchange may close, but its brokers must wait in idleness for it to reopen. A collapse in the cotton industry in India means starvation for thousands of spinners; as members of the weaver caste they dare not take to any other means of livelihood.

In changing your calling, your separation from old associates is necessary because of the lines drawn between one class and another. The squire does not dine with the shopkeeper; the housemaid with the housekeeper. A Sudra cultivator refuses to eat with all other Sudra sub-castes. Even a Pariah will not entertain Chucklers, the cobbler caste. Our servants and tradespeople may make use of special entrances and back stairs with entire safety, but the Pariah who sets more than one foot inside a Brahman's house runs the risk of death. The range of pollution of beef-eating Pariahs is sixty-four feet.

Caste feeling impels not only to segregation, it imparts to the groups it creates traits not at all pertinent or consequential. Consider its irrelevant-

cies in India. Among the Nairs, polyandry is a caste feature, among the Kullars, robbery. The Lambadis, a nomad, half-brigand, half-trader caste, may drink no water not drawn from springs or wells. When a Morsa-Okkala-Makkalu caste-woman marries off her eldest daughter, she has to amputate two joints of two fingers of her right hand. The castes in the Carnatic may never wash their clothes. Throughout the country the cut and colour of clothes, the way of putting them on, the wearing of jewels are all particulars determined by caste.¹ And so too, if less rigorously, with us. "She wears her clothes like a lady," we say, "he dresses like a gentleman." But you must not only dress in accordance with your station in life, your whole scale of living must be suitable. Likewise your pastimes, pleasures, and æsthetic pursuits. Members of one of the social divisions of Mota, one of the Banks Islands, are precluded from singing songs.² In Greece

¹ Dubois, J. A., *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*, pp. 17-20. Oxford, 1899.

² Rivers, vol. i., p. 23. The classification is rather of kinship than of occupation, but it has caste features. The caste character of such divisions in Fiji is marked. (*Ib.*, vol. i., p. 265.)

no slave or servant was allowed to study painting, a taboo applying in India only to the higher castes. "He turned out to be an artist," comments a native of Kewanee, Illinois, in a recent American play; "too bad, his family were nice people too."

Class immobility and class exclusiveness, class consciousness and class struggle, seem to be the stages of the obsession men have been imprisoned in by caste. Even today few are free from this obsession. Now and then a poet escapes, now and then a vagabond. But even the poet has to fight continually for his freedom, once he leaves the dignities of his solitude, and the vagabond is free only because he is content to be confused with the derelict or outcast. ✓

And yet caste is truly not as enveloping as it was. Rents have been made in its nets—even in Kewanee, Illinois. For in Kewanee, as elsewhere, wealth accumulates, and wealth is a solvent of caste. Even in its primitive forms wealth makes for mobility. On the northwest coast of America the giver of potlatches becomes a chief; prompt payment of pigs ensures a rapid promotion in

the orders of the secret societies of Melanesia. However, not until barter has been replaced by money and credit, is the idea formulated that caste prerogatives have their price. "Nowadays money is caste," is a Hindu saying.¹ Asked "whether poverty impeacheth or staineth nobility," that staunch defender of the gentry, Master Henry Peacham, can only answer: "Riches are as an ornament, not the cause of nobility."² Contempt for the *parvenu*, the *nouveau riche*, is the last stand of caste against the overcoming of its barriers by wealth.

Money in relation to the category of caste is somewhat analogous to birthdays in relation to the category of age. Money directs attention to the individual. It provides opportunities for individual expression.³ It does not of itself do away with class marks, like birthdays it seems at times to favour them, for those who want them

¹ Risley, App. I., p. xxxi.

² *Compleat Gentleman*, 1634, p. 10. Oxford, 1906.

³ For example, in the New Hebrides, on Pentecost Island, "a rich man after drinking will take sugar cane in his mouth and after spitting this out, will take a second piece, shoot it out of his mouth, and utter a long drawn-out cry which is a sign to everyone that he is a rich man." (Rivers, vol. i., p. 212.)

it is an instrument; but it does give people a chance, however slight, to choose the marks they fancy. It is a master key to the doors of caste (to the doors locked by the categories of sex and age as well), and it introduces confusion into those matters caste once claimed for its own,—into distinctions of dress or diet, or housing, of consumption in general, and not least into caste endogamy. In India, for example, "hypergamy," marrying up, is a matter of wealth. Bridegrooms from a higher caste come high, and only families of means can afford them. The charming Japanese lady who was once my hostess in Tokio had never been received at court although her father-in-law was one of the Elder Statesmen. Her own father was a millionaire, her grandfather a coolie. I have heard of cases of marrying for position or money in the United States.

Money undermines the customary foundations of caste and money gives mobility, but would it not appear to recreate caste, merely substituting a property psychosis for an occupation or birth psychosis, asking how much have you got, instead of what do you do or who was your father? Does

it not replace hereditary or occupation classes by income classes, distinctions through birth or work by distinctions through income, distinctions between labour and capital, between the masses and the classes, between the poor man and the rich? Among the Goajira Indians of Colombia it is only the poor man who may be insulted with impunity,¹ a distinction met elsewhere. Even that great miscellany of collective activities which has been captured from caste control through political democracy is at the mercy of "the Interests," the moneyed people. Democracy is a prey to plutocracy.

To safeguard democracy and to complete its reaction against caste control, the socialist would give industrial functions to the state, democratizing economy. As to the justifiability of the ambitions of industrial democracy or socialism there is, I suppose, little critical dispute; it is only its realization that is questioned. Two outcomes are possible, depending on the adoption of the principle of reward according to need or of the principle of

¹ Simons, F. A. A., "An Exploration of the Goajira Peninsula." *Proc. Roy. Geog. Soc., N. S.*, vol. vii. (1885), p. 796.

reward according to service. In the first case, caste distinctions will be eliminated through the formation of but one class, an assimilation the critics of socialism have in mind when they upbraid it with the stigma of mediocrity, of levelling down, of checking progress through discouraging individual variation, and of sentimentally ignoring the variations the difference in occupations necessarily develops. If, on the other hand, the principle of pay for service is followed, caste inequalities, the critics assert, will not only continue, they will be heightened, and caste control will be greatly strengthened. In argument, they point to the bureaucratic, self-seeking, log-rolling character of the employees of the present-day political democracy. Moreover unrestricted majority dictation in production will inevitably lower below the point of stimulation the reward of skilled labour or inventiveness, scant at best. The unskilled labourer will vote himself higher pay than the mechanic or physician or artist.

From such difficulties the youngest of economic radicals, the syndicalists, keep clear. The syndicalists are not bothered by questions of political

control, for with the State they would have nothing to do. Craft control of industry is their object, class consciousness and class war, their methods. Syndicalism is a vehement outburst of caste exclusiveness. It is an expression too of the greediness of the caste spirit. The syndicalist must never think of himself, he is told, except as a member of his craft. He is to be completely possessed by the category of caste.

Contemporaneous with syndicalism and socialism have been many radicals who do not find any less equivocal or more pleasing tag for themselves than that of social reformers. Their social philosophy is too indefinite and uncertain for a less dubious name. Beyond saying that they would give greater opportunities to this or that handicapped or disabled group, they have no formulations. Sometimes they would enfranchise a disfranchised group—peasants or negroes or women. Sometimes they favour trade-unionism as a weapon for higher wages and more leisure. Various measures to remedy economic hardships get their support—the redistribution of land, single tax, income or inheritance tax, insurance against illness or un-

employment, old age pensions, mothers' pensions, the minimum day or wage. For bettering public communication and transportation, sanitation, health, education, recreation, they favour any agent at hand—public or private; they are opportunists, averse neither to state control nor to private munificence. To them social reform means increased social opportunity, opportunity through a more equable distribution of private property or opportunity through an increase of collective facilities irrespective of private property.

Incoherent, erratic, and empirical as are these movements it is in them that freedom from caste control seems to lie. None, the social opportunists seem to say, none must be categorized by his occupation, nor his opportunities as a man limited to those it affords. His earning power should not set the bounds to his opportunities for social intercourse or personal development. Let us dissociate the worker from his work in so far as it does not truly affect him. His work must determine much of his life, but a large part it should not determine at all. His working clothes he will not wear outside working hours. You could not classi-

fy him by the way he eats or drinks as you could a Kwakiutl nobleman¹ or other well-bred Americans. Nor could you tell him by his speech as you could a smith among the Masai,² or manual labourers elsewhere. In his work he may develop a special code of manners or morals, but outside of it his conduct will not be class conduct, his ethical theory not class theory. His outlook will not be a class outlook. Independently of the worth of his work to himself or to society, more and more of the facilities of the world will become his; the place he lives in, his neighbourhood, and the places he is in touch with, various sub-divisions of the world, all will have more to give him; his life as a neighbour and as a world citizen will be ampler and richer.

¹ As it is undignified to drink water at meals he does not eat anything that would make him cough. (Boas, Franz, "The Kwakiutl of Vancouver Islands," p. 427, *Mem. Amer. Mus. Nat. Hist.* vol. v., Leyden, 1905-09.)

² Hollis, p. 331.

PLACE-FELLOWSHIP

ECONOMIC exchange is a disintegrating factor, not only with castes, but with the groups we may call place-fellowships—migratory hordes or fixed hamlets, tribes, or cities, or nations. In very early cultures a feeble instrument for inter-group assimilation—the Veddas once put down their articles of barter on the edge of their tribal land and never laid eyes on the Cingalese they traded with—exchange is becoming one of the most effective means for world unity. The preservation of world-wide trade and credit begins to rival as a collectivist objective the preservation of national integrity, and it is the persistence of national checks on freedom of commerce, together with the theory that trade follows the flag, that more than any other condition renders still possible that extreme self-assertion of nationalism, international war.

The tariff system is a conspicuous example of

the way the horde or neighbourhood category will spread, like the other categories, over fields not its own. Given the modern industrial system, protective tariffs are obviously the outcome of overweening group ambition, ambition the free trade movement of the past century has been for the most part an attempt to check. The theory of free trade is directed against the theory that neighbourhood¹ groups should go out of their way to express group spirit. The theory of free trade is a revolt also against neighbourhood exclusiveness. The truly primitive, unmitigated protectionist objects to the importation of foreign goods on any terms. A Juarez Pueblo Indian watching me one morning drinking a cup of coffee remarked that his people were said to have thrown away the coffee beans the Spaniards had given them. Among the Akikúyu the introduction of

¹ In so far as tariffs are maintained through class interests (the interests of a dynastic house or of groups of manufacturers or groups of their employees), logically they represent an encroachment by caste upon the larger neighbourhood or national group. Even so they are made to appeal to the neighbourhood or national sentiment, its sentiment of self-aggrandizement. For example, to keep up the standard of living of the American workman, whatever the cost to the consumer, is represented as a patriotic duty.

"breakfast foods" would have been no easy job, such is the native repugnance to unaccustomed cereals.¹ The tin boxes Speke carried on his expedition through East Africa as well as Speke himself, were objected to by the natives.

Not only foreign goods are objectionable, we see, but the foreigner himself. He is kept out altogether or admitted with care and under suspicion. As an alien he is discriminated against in many ways. His right to trade is questioned, or his right to labour. Participation in the communal interests or rights is denied him. He may have no voice in government or he may be ineligible to office. Only a native born American can become President of the United States. Sometimes the foreigner has to live in a locality assigned him. The right to make use of the communal land or, given private ownership, the right to acquire title to land may be denied him. In the seventeenth century the Turks allowed no foreigner to wear green.²

Shutting the alien out of communal lands, deny-

¹ Routledge, p. 49.

² *A Pepys of Mogul India*, p. 5 New York, 1913.

ing him the right to hunt over them or pasture cattle, is merely a practical expression of group exclusiveness, in this case of neighbourhood exclusiveness, but denial of the right to hold land given, as in California or in Russia, the prevalence of private ownership, this denial is an outcome of the mere ambitiousness, the idealistic ambitiousness of a social category. The very existence of national boundary lines—when there is no communal territory—is evidence of the idealistic spread of the spirit of neighbourhood. The boundaries of tribal territory may correspond to practical needs and actual uses, but the boundary lines of the modern state are mere manifestations of an overgrown and purely sentimental sense of neighbourhood, the hypertrophy which is an essential component of the emotion we call patriotism.

In this emotion group conceit is also essential. To the patriot, one race or people, his own, is intrinsically superior. The Hottentots call themselves “the men of men” and many tribes name themselves merely *the men*. Of a gentle-mannered foreigner a Greenlander will say “he begins to be a

man," *i. e.*, a Greenlander.¹ We too commend a man as being "a white man," "after all an Aryan," "just like an American." "If a great people," says a Russian patriot, "does not believe that the truth is only to be found in itself alone (in itself alone and in it exclusively); if it does not believe that it alone is fit and destined to raise up and save all the rest by its truth, it would at once sink into being ethnographical material, and not a great people."²

Nationalism is the huge tumor group conceit has let grow in modern times upon place-fellowship. And on it are two other growths, colonization or imperialism and national or racial³ assimilation. Under the name of national honour, welfare, glory, the group aggrandizement goes on, nationalization physically and psychically we must have, we say or assume, nationalization at all costs and by all means, by the pressure of ridicule or scorn, by

¹ Westermarck, Edward, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, vol. ii., p. 172. London, 1908.

² Dostoevsky, *The Possessed*, p. 234. Tr. C. Garnett.

³ Hereafter I shall omit the term "race." It is "only a disguise of the idea of nationality." (Boas, Franz, "Race and Nationality," *Bull. Amer. Ass. for International Conciliation*, p. 8, Jan., 1915.)

intolerance of all differences between those who join us and ourselves, by endless other forms of social compulsion, not omitting war.

And the tumor thrives at the expense of healthy tissue. Real neighbourhood interests are neglected. Its own railway franchises are stolen from the community, or its rate of traffic accidents grows appalling, while it concerns itself with the securing by its Foreign Office of the right to build a railway in an undeveloped country. Its own watersheds or watercourses are polluted or rendered unsightly, while its attention is set upon the building of a great canal through another continent by the national government. That their nation acquire a piece of territory rich in forests or mines seems more important to people than to plant trees on their own streets or remove the dumps in their own yards or clear out their own gutters. The failure of a brigand band to salute their national flag seems more of a disgrace than sending their little children to work at night in mill or factory.

The co-operative spirit is not fostered by the national spirit, nor the spirit of autonomy. Rather

are they confused and diverted, diverted to foreign conquest or colonization, and so confused that to bring to people a sense of reality they need to be embodied in a figurehead, a ruler. In his person, group character is best pictured, group virtue respected. Through personification the fiction of nationality takes on a semblance of actuality. *L'état c'est moi* was a milder piece of arrogance than we commonly think. How effectual a bit of mysticism it is, the embodiment of the tribe in its chief, of the state in its sovereign or, to use the republican term, in its representative, we see today in the conflict between the European nations. But for the realization of itself through its chiefs, the spirit of nationalism might not be working such great havoc to the world.

To preclude such havoc in the future two political notions are gaining currency—a spread of political democracy, a world federation. Both these views are open to criticism, the one as inadequate for the end in mind, the other, as commonly held, as vicious in its conception. Is not the democrat contenting himself with words? The leaders

of a democracy are quite as much its embodiment, quite as potent instruments for its political myths as the most ardent believer in his own divine right to govern, and a democracy may be as ready as an autocracy to go to war. As for the idea of world federation, if it means, as it generally does in the popular political philosophy, merely a larger state than any of the existing nations, a greater aggrandizement, a world federation in this sense is an even greater fiction than the fiction of nationalism, the emotion it inspires about humanity perhaps a more dangerous sentimentality than patriotism.

One of the circumstances of the European war furnishes an illustration for a different social ambition. We are told that the men in the opposing war trenches are overcome from time to time by the mere fact of their neighbourhood; they fraternize, they make friends. They share the opportunities their neighbourhood supplies, the water supply, recreation, some bizarre chance for amusement. Such joint pastimes must be engaged in somewhat surreptitiously for, say the officers, if they were to any extent allowed, the

men would not fight.¹ Before the reality of neighbourhood, the unrealities of nationality would vanish.

From our political philosophy why not let them also vanish? By giving up its pretensions, the spirit of place-fellowship may come into its own and at the same time cease to be a drag upon social progress. It has only to recognize its limitations, distinguishing between its own natural, indefeasible interests and world-wide interests. All matters of communication and transportation, currency, scientific research, many matters of health and sanitation, let place-fellows appreciate as functions of a world-wide administration, many matters of water, light, heat, and power supply, as functions of administrative units corresponding to natural divisions, of water commissions, for example, whose jurisdiction will cover an entire watershed. Their own peculiar interests consist of facilities for recreation, for rest or convalescence, for education, for hospitality, for economic co-

¹ "Ain't it 'Ell to get up every morning and have to hate the Germans!" exclaims Tommy Atkins in a recent cartoon of a British trench at daybreak. (*The Masses*, July, 1915.)

operation in endless ways. In other words let fellowship be determined by objective realities, by the world as it is, rather than by a sense of subjective, mystical union, a union regardless or contemptuous of natural facts or conditions.

Their interest undiverted to remote, mystical ends, place-fellows will make the most of the resources of their neighbourhood, conserving and improving them. The idea of communal rights to the beauties and resources of nature will develop. Streams and lakes and ocean beaches, forests and mountain heights will cease to be private property. Perhaps the theory of land holding at large will change, the land to be leased to the highest bidders or taxed in some such way as the single-taxers propose. Given this source of income, neighbourhood facilities might be greatly increased—brooks and rivers and lakes and woods stocked and preserved for all, gardens and parks set out, and wild stretches kept wild. Those means to the enjoyment of outdoor life which most persons cannot forego and yet cannot afford would also be made communal—courts and fields for outdoor games, boats and boat-houses, rest-houses and

open-air pavilions. And neighbourhood indoor life would be made interesting and diverting through communal places of amusement, of instruction, and of meeting. There would be public guest-houses, and the practice of collective hospitality would become an important part of the community life.

There would be not only public hostelries for visitors, transport would be entirely free—from one street to another, from one end of the world to another. Then travel would become a normal part of everybody's life. The habit of living in lairs would die out. People would learn in what parts of the world they could do best—best for themselves and for their chosen community. In other words a distribution of population would become possible in accordance with natural facilities and with human idiosyncrasy or disposition. Great congestions would cease, and involuntary individual isolation.

Nor would the isolation of any local group long continue possible. The pressure upon it of other groups it would not withstand, once it fully realized that in the particulars it most cared for its right

to home rule was guaranteed, and in course of time its truly anti-social resistances to the standards of other groups would break down. This view of the voluntary conformity of backward groups is, I am well aware, open to challenge. I can but retort that the experiment of standardizing pacifically and as far as any direct benefit is concerned disinterestedly a backward local group has never been tried, indeed it has never even been considered.¹


Am I picturing an utopia? There is much already in contemporaneous conditions and tendencies to justify the picture. Consider the amazing gains within the century in communication and transportation; consider the gains in freedom of trade, in economic co-operation, in the sanitation of large areas, in the conservation of natural resources; consider what is called the democratization of education, of hygiene, of pleasure. That all these movements have had different

¹ Perhaps in this connection missionary efforts come to mind. They have been on the whole pacific and disinterested. But what kind of standardizing have they attempted? Surely not the kind that is respectful of the purely local variation and concerned only with the inter-group relation.

motives and methods, that there has been little or no schematic social philosophy about them, may affect but little their final practical outcome. Where do they lead? is the question of moment, not Whence have they come?

But the social philosophy is indeed changing. The theory of communal aggrandizement is yielding to the theory of communal co-operation, the enlargement of communal facilities is becoming the only criterion for the enlargement of administrative units, social impulses and ideas are being purged of their mystical element.

It is because of this mystical element that dis-possession of communal resources is so meekly born. The lack of a real place-fellowship is compensated for in the imagination by a fictitious unit of fellowship, by nationalism. The sense of neighbourhood lost, the assurance we crave of belonging to a group is given by a sense of nationality. The group sense thus satisfied, we become indifferent to neighbourhood communism. It is a vicious circle. But let neighbours once come into their own and this sense of nationality will languish. Neighbourliness at a distance will yield



to neighbourliness at close hand. The gregarious instinct will not have to go abroad for satisfaction. The sense of social solidarity or participation will be satisfied by realities, not make-believe. From the dreams of world empire men will awake to find themselves in a real community needing them and by them needed. One more step men will have taken away from mysticism and towards reality.¹

Accompanying this step there will be a great shift of direction in the collective will to power. In primitive culture that will expresses itself in shaping fellow-creatures. In modern life the tendency grows for the collective will to spend itself on the

¹ This particular step, I may be told and told persuasively by readers of that very enlightening book, Professor Veblen's *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*, this particular step would be merely a step back to the anarchistic neighbourhood groups from which our neolithic Baltic-North Sea culture has emerged. I have indeed taken account of the home rule spirit of that culture, in a way that to Professor Veblen may seem a curious bit of atavism, an unconscious verification too of his theory of our racial urge, unconscious because it is only as this writing goes to print that I have read his discerning analysis. I have taken account of the home rule spirit because I had to—I felt it in myself and in the people around me. But that spirit, I believe, may be saved from the mystical excesses it has been guilty of in the past, saved too from being played upon by dynastic ambitions, by a more enlightened self-interest and a greater appreciation of the world at large, a critical appreciation utterly impossible of course to the early Baltic culture.

conditions people live under. Nationalism or imperialism has been an outcome of the early type of the will to power. The fellowship to come will satisfy itself through controlling—not people—but conditions.

Group dominion, nationalism or imperialism, is the last conspicuous refuge of the mystic. Just as for the religious zealot there is no place for nationalism, for the ardent nationalist there is no need of religion—suffer it though he may as a kind of servant, as Jahveh is today being called in to valet Pan-Germanism or Pan-Slavism,¹ or the Shinto gods, the Japanese State.

But it is not for the sake of *bushido* or *kultur*, not for nation or empire, that the world calls for redistricting. Whatever redistricting they may effect in the years or even centuries to come, imperialists or nationalists will remain unconvincing and archaic figures, figures enslaved to a social category, figures overcome, whether as conquerors or as conquered, by their political status.

¹ "God is the synthetic personality of the whole people, taken from its beginning to its end," declares Shatov in *The Possessed*. "You reduce God to a simple attribute of nationality," rejoins Stavrogin.

Freedom from this subordination is going to be an extremely slow and indirect process, a matter of infinite adjustments, of endless experiment, of that conversion of men's minds to which no time measures can be applied. It will be the final fruit, in any social future we can at all foresee, of the habit of meeting facts which modern culture initiated and of the substitution it encourages of personality desires for status desires. In that consummation, one foresees every person in the world a member of many political groups, ranging from his own neighbourhood to a world-wide electorate. One foresees the world electorate and each of its subdivisions determined by the interests natural to each. One foresees the globe covered by local self-governing groups varying from a mere handful of persons, from single persons in fact, to groups of many thousands. The natural resources of these groups are communal. From one to the other the degree of economic co-operation will vary greatly—from completely individualistic enterprise to completely collectivistic. The tendency in all of them will be away from control of persons to control of nature and econ-

omy, but here too the differentiations will be very great. Each group will be connected with other groups or with the whole world through a world-wide system of free communication and transportation, through free trade, through the common possession of natural facilities, through a common sanitary system, through its claims upon scientists and upon all kinds of practical experts. All inter-group functions will be administered by representatives from all the groups concerned, or rather for wide-spreading functions there will be larger consolidations. For world-wide functions there will be a world-wide group.

This is world federation, if you like, but world federation based not on any fictitious principle of mystical unity but on actual conditions and the need of efficient functioning. It will come about through experience, not through mysticism. Mystical ideas of humanity, the theory of the brotherhood of man, have given history great figures, figures withal pitiful and grotesque. The theory has provoked, too, great tragedies, for in the long run responsibility for much persecution and for many wars must be shouldered by it. The Cru-

sades and the Inquisition were its perfectly logical expressions. Even greater and more grotesque tragedies are ahead of us if the notions of many of our contemporaneous world federationists take shape. Desire for the brotherhood of man is as much a status desire as any other class desire. For it to be realized, mankind would have to become a single, homogeneity-exacting class, appallingly tyrannical, a monster of oppression. But despite temporary triumphs, will this mystical desire for human brotherhood, ever be realized? An anachronism as it is in modern culture, to that culture's dominant desire for the free expression of personality must it not in time succumb?

FRIENDSHIP

NEIGHBOURS, lovers, brothers, "they are good friends too," one sometimes hears. "Your dear friend, accidentally your fond mother," wrote a woman, the other day, so I heard, to her daughter—to the scandal of the girl's school-mistress. To that lady, no doubt, friendship is an upstart category, for it to usurp the place of kinship or even intrude upon it is an impertinence. Never would she agree with Cicero that, because of its essential benevolence, friendship is superior to kinship. All friendship deserves, she thinks, is a subordinate place. "Your best friend, because your mother," would have been the seemly reference.

Borrowing plumage is nothing new for friendship, and it is from kinship it most often borrows. Its assimilation is made ceremonially through a covenant of brotherhood. When a Masai wishes to make a person his brother or sister he gives the

other a red bead—an *ol-tureshi*. Thereafter each calls the other *patureshi*, the giver or receiver of a bead.¹ Not a bead, but blood is, in many cases, as we know, the seal of adoptive brotherhood. Among the Akikúyu, for example, blood drawn from the forehead and chest of each covenanter is placed in the roasted heart of a sheep. The heart is then divided and each eats half.² Thereafter, kindred spirits, each no doubt will stand up for the other through thick and thin.

The age-class is also called upon to buttress friendship. We speak of childhood's friends, friends from the nursery. Growing up together, is it not "natural" for you to feel friendly? In those New Guinea settlements whose age-classes I referred to it is too "natural" to be optional. You must feel friendly. If you not only belong to the same *kimla* but live in the same hamlet, to your chum or *eriam* you must lend your fishing nets, or, if his garden crop has failed him, you will provide him and his with food. You will even lend him your wife.³ There are other settlements in New

¹ Hollis, p. 323.

² Routledge, p. 176.

³ Seligmann, pp. 472-3.

Guinea where the fathers of boys or girls born on the same day exchange presents—dogs, pigs, armshells—and thereby make their infants fast friends, friends for life.¹

School and college friendships borrow somewhat too from the age-class. The different “years” keep apart. Most of the “secret societies” of Yale are composed of men in the same year, the outgoing group choosing the incoming. At the College of Maynooth the personal choice is somewhat greater. Three students may arrange to walk together after supper, in different sets for each night of the week, the arrangement lasting for the year; but in Catholic Dublin as in Congregational New Haven the college classes themselves are kept apart—at Maynooth the junior house for all purposes, the senior and middle meeting only for meals, eaten in silence.²

¹ Seligmann, pp. 69, 70.

² O'Donovan, Gerald, *Father Ralph*, pp. 195, 204-5. New York, 1914. The retention of the age-class in ecclesiastical circles is one of the many evidences they give of conservatism. They are retentive, too, of sex and caste distinctions. As for kinship and place-fellowship, those categories likewise get the support of the Church, unless they become too arrogant. Even friendship has the backing of the gods. “Where two faithful friends meet, God makes up the third.” Supernatural sanctions attach every-

Growing old together is also an achievement of friendship, and sometimes old people are bullied a little by their juniors into being friends just because they are of an age. A recent autobiographer describes how there lives at the other end of her town another old lady whom she likes but with whom she has never been really intimate. "My children," she writes, "feel that I don't see enough of women of my own age." They therefore have recourse to the old lady across town, one Mrs. Allen. "You look 'down' mother; shan't I telephone to Mrs. Allen? Or let me run down in the motor and get her for you." Or, "I'm just going over to Lembury; shan't I drop you at Mrs. Allen's for a half-hour?" "Mrs. Allen," chuckles the writer, "has become to me the symbol of 'amusing mother'."¹

Caste too may be a mainstay for friendship. Are there not business or professional friends, political friends, friends to count on or stand up for, friends to play or spree with, friends made

where to the covenants of friendship. (Westermarck, vol. ii. pp. 208-9.)

¹ *Autobiography of an Elderly Woman*, pp. 125-6.

friends as among the Koita of New Guinea,¹ by a smoke or chew, friends to pass the summer with, friends to talk to, many of these quasi caste-free friends summed up in that bizarre phrase "social friends"—the friends you do not make use of, at least not obviously, whom yet you would have of your own station in life, your peers? "The most valuable and lasting friendship is that which exists between persons of the same rank,"—the wording of the doctrine is Javanese.²

Friends as friends, mere friends, when one comes to think of it and to take seriously the reiterated opinion, mere friends are indeed rather rare, and the art of making friends to many, one suspects, unknown. The relationship may be so regardless of conventions, so heedless of status. It cancels, as Emerson says, the thick walls of sex, age, relation, circumstance, those protective barriers most of us cannot do without. And then having thrown down our defences, it sets up such exorbitant demands. It expects a personal relationship.

¹ Seligmann, p. 69.

² Raffles, Th. S., *The History of Java*, vol. i., p. 289. London, 1830.

In view of this expectation, however unfulfilled it may go, why account friendship among the social categories at all? Because, I take it, although friendship has had a glimpse of that contact between personalities society will sometime rejoice in, yet even in its purer forms it is enough of a conventionalized relationship to be entitled to a place as a social institution. Exclusiveness, we surmise, is the foremost character of the social category, and friendship tends to be exclusive. Let its own standard bearers and classical authorities testify. "He who has many friends has no friend," is a maxim not only of Aristotle but of every European people. Cicero has Lælius refer to Scipio as a friend such as he had never had before and never would find again; and friendship, he explicitly states, is an affection confined to two "or at any rate to very few,"¹ a view of the boundaries of friendship often favoured. Friendship "cannot subsist in its perfection, say some of those who are learned in this warm lore of the heart, betwixt more than two." If for himself, Emerson adds, he is not so strict in his terms, it may be, he suggests,

¹ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, iii., v.

because he has not known so high a fellowship as others.¹ Whether an expression of its nobility or of its conventionality, friendship, model friendship, has certainly been thought of through the centuries as a pairing. Famous friends have gone in pairs—Orestes and Pylades, Damon and Pythias, Nesius and Eurialus, Roland and Oliver. In humbler circles too, such exclusiveness is recognized. “My best friend,” we say, “my bosom friend,” or, in the oriental phrase, “a friend—one soul, two bodies.”

Friendship gives that sense of union and assurance of likeness that is the very breath of life to the social category. Emerson’s reference to the practice of exchanging names with a friend recognizes the desire for identification—even if the interpretation is a bit of modern rather than primitive transcendentalism. The practice, he writes, “would signify that in their friends each loves his own soul,” or, in Cicero’s words, looked “upon a kind of image of himself.”² The entire strength of friendship, according to Cicero, is an entire agreement of inclinations, pursuits, and sentiments, “a

¹ *Friendship*.

² *De Amicitia*, vii.

complete union of feeling on all subjects."¹ To live in friendship, writes another Roman, "is to have the same desires and the same aversions."

And that they may remain the same, Sallust might well have added, they must be stable. Friendship, true friendship, is ever held to be a stable relationship, imparting the same sense of permanency the other social categories assure us of, only, being less certain of its position in society, friendship feels called upon to be more self-assertive. Its backers are constantly vouching for its orthodoxy. "I feel as if I had known you always," your good friend tells you. "True friendships are eternal," writes Cicero.² "*Qui cesse d'être ami, ne l'a jamais été.*"

In this account of the categorical character of friendship we have referred most often to Cicero and Emerson. To read them together is exciting, so informing is it of the ways traversed in two thousand years not only by the category of friendship, but by the categorical in general. The philosophers agree in their conception of the

¹ *De Amicitia*, iv., v.

² *Ib.*, ix. Because, forsooth, nature, and in nature friendship originates, nature can never change.

essence of friendship, to both it is compounded of sincerity and tenderness; to both it is a personal relationship. But to the modern it has sloughed off in large part its more primitive features. Emerson has no desire that his friend be his counterpart. "Let him not cease an instant to be himself. The only joy I have in his being mine, is that the *not mine* is *mine*." By the unlikeness of his friend he is stimulated, not abashed or frightened. He does not crave the assurance of congeniality so precious to Cicero. Nor is the unbroken companionship of his friend desirable to Emerson. He is even anxious to hold him at arm's length, to keep him at a distance which to Cicero's way of thinking no proper friendship could survive. "Leave this touching and cloying. . . . You shall not come nearer a man by getting into his house." "Oh, but you do!" We can hear Cicero exclaiming. "We had one house between us, Scipio and I," boasts Lælius, Cicero's spokesman, "the same food, we were inseparable."¹ To

¹ *De Amicitia*, xxvii. "They cease to be friends who dwell afar off," was the Latin maxim corresponding to the Greek: "Friends living far away are no friends."

INTERCLASSIFICATION

TO get standing and respectability, friendship, the newcomer, keeps peculiarly close to the other social categories, but all the categories are more or less in league, confirming and vitalizing one another. Reverence for age is enhanced by respect for rank when it is the old men in a community who hold its positions of trust and dignity, or when social position depends upon advancing years. "Befitting his age and station," we say, not clearly distinguishing the measure due each condition. Nor, alleging that one we know is too young and unimportant for a given place, do we trouble to make out the relation between the two disqualifications. How youth and age are kept in their place in relation to sex, courting or marrying at the risk of derision, we have already noted. The position of the *old maid* we might also have mentioned. "What sight can be more pitiable or repulsive," wrote in 1846 "a young lady's com-

panion," "than that of a female, advancing in the vale of years, yet retaining her inordinate thirst for the society and admiration of gentlemen!"¹ A snub indeed for the old maid!

But the married woman is kept in her place, too, through classification by age. I have heard her referred to as the "old woman" by Anglo-Saxon husbands. More exact, a Masai calls his wife by the age-class to which she actually belongs.² By her young bachelor acquaintances, we may note however, a Masai married woman is addressed as "old lady,"³ the barrier of even a supposititious difference in age too serviceable to be foregone. "There cannot be a more absurd or disgusting affectation," opines the Rev. John Bennet, than for married women, "the sober, aged autumn," to wear girlish ornaments, "the livery of spring."⁴

Between sex and caste, and sex and place-fellowship, there are close relations, witness the various kinds of marriage restrictions based on belonging to different local groups or based on caste, witness the insistence on celibacy by certain

¹ Coxe, p. 52.

² Hollis, p. 303. It is "unlucky" to call her by her own name.

³ *Ib.*, pp. 286-7.

⁴ *Letters to a Young Lady*, p. 146.

castes, or the exclusion of either the married¹ or the unmarried² from community life. Moreover men and women are far shyer in general with one another when there is a difference of class between them or a difference of residence. Separate residence is often a feature of the separation in general of the sexes. In Blackfellow hordes, for example, the men's camp is separate from the women's. Among the Todas there are old men's villages and on the West Coast of Africa there are settlements of women who have had the misfor-

¹ In illustration of the harem point of view I quote an author of our pioneer West. "The wife resigns, or ought always to resign her claims to general attention; and to concentrate and confine her regards, and wishes, and objects, to her chosen companion and domestic claims and scenes. She has quitted the public stage." (Coxe, pp. 257-8.)

² The unmarried Corean is shut out from adult society; in affairs of importance he has no voice. He is but a child. (Griffis, W. E., *Corea*, p. 246. New York, 1907.) A statute of colonial Connecticut forbade any "house-keeper" or "master of a family" without allowance of the selectmen to give "entertainment or habitation" to a single person. (Howard, G. E., *A History of Matrimonial Institutions*, vol. ii., p. 153. Chicago & London, 1904.) "A single woman is, particularly, defenceless," writes the Rev. John Bennet. "She cannot move beyond the precincts of her house without apprehensions. She cannot go with ease or safety into public." (*Letters to a Young Lady*, p. 232.)

Among the Kols of India, thanks to the belief that the unmarried are soulless, the celibate dead are shut out from joining the shades of their ancestors. (Van Gennep, A., *Les Rites de Passage*, p. 218. Paris, 1909.)

tune to give birth to twins. Even separate heavens have been assigned to the sexes. The Nahuatl believed the souls of men lived in the East, the souls of women, or rather of the select among women, in the West.¹ The ideas of the Blackfellows of New South Wales were more hazy, but wherever the souls of women did go, it was not, they were persuaded, to the heaven of the men.²

Kinship also accentuates sex distinctions, its rules of endogamy or exogamy favouring indirectly grouping by sex. It avowedly supports the category of sex when youths are taught to honour their mother or sister in the person of all women, or at least of all "nice" women, or when an older man is expected to treat a girl "as if she were his daughter."—On the other hand sex distinctions may accentuate kinship. Sex relations between kindred or between those who, like foster or adoptive relatives or god-parents, have assimilated themselves with kindred are taboo.

¹ Nuttall, Zelia, "The Fundamental Principles of Old and New World Civilizations," *Archæol. & Ethnol. Papers of the Peabody Museum*, vol. ii. (1901), p. 38.

² Westermarck, vol. ii., p. 673.

Kinship, caste, and place-fellowship are all linked together. In China the officials of a district a parricide lived in were put out of office or demoted; his immediate neighbours were severely punished.¹ Family rows in general are condemned by one's neighbours, and neglect of family duties criticized or penalized. In India a failure to attend wedding or funeral ceremonies or to invite to them the expectant relatives calls for outcasting. The rank of a Chinese ruler who showed a lack of filial piety through neglecting his ancestral rites was reduced,² just as in the upper circles of European society the conception of *noblesse oblige* has been at times a means of controlling wayward progeny. We have already noted the service of the eponymous ancestor in binding together the citizens. The tie of blood may be an explicit condition of holding land. It is a rule among the Kabyles that whosoever bequeaths his property to "an unrelated stranger" is fined and his bequest is void.³ Cuzco, the capital of ancient Peru, was

¹ Doolittle, vol. i., p. 140.

² *Lt Kt*, bk. iii., sec. ii., 15.

³ Hanoteau, A. and Letourneux, A. *La Kabylie et les coutumes Kabyles*, vol. iii., p. 367. Paris, 1893.

divided into four quarters, the quarters presumably of the different Inca clans. Neighbours have also in certain settlements to be castemen. In the cities of ancient Egypt members of the same craft formed one neighbourhood. The mediæval guilds of Europe lived together, as live today the guilds of Chinese cities. Although the castes of India are distributed, castemen tend to group themselves in one locality. Communities like those in the Nilgiri Hills where the Todas are the herdsmen, the Badagas, the agriculturists, the Kotas, the artisans, such groups cannot be differentiated at all into caste and tribe.

And yet perfect co-operation between the social categories there is not; at times they clash, hindering or checking one another. Friendship, perhaps because it is the youngest of them all, is often snubbed. "All confidential discourse with persons of your age is to be avoided, writes one of the counsellors of young ladies I often quote. "If you must have a confidant, a mother or aunt is the proper person"—kinship and age-class we see here ranged together against friendship,

² Coxe, p. 71.

friendship decked in the feathers of age-class. Aversion to the "confidential discourse" of friendship is frequently displayed, too, by caste groups. Take the Catholic orders. Their rule generally provides that their members avoid walking together in couples.¹

But friendship in turn may assert itself. It sometimes breaks down the sex category, albeit surreptitiously or timidly. So timidly, in fact, that it generally continues to avow adherence to the separation of the sexes. Among the South Slavs when friendship was sworn between a man and woman, the covenant precluded sexual intimacy on pain of supernatural disaster. "A snake will bite you," sings the girl whose sworn brother courts her in a Dalmatian folk-song.² It is not by a snake but by a special term, Platonic friendship, that among us friendship assures sex its barriers will be preserved.—The keeping up of sex barriers, let us note incidentally, may be

¹ In these sophisticated circles, perhaps a precaution against homosexuality. It seems unnecessary in this discussion to comment on the relations between friendship and homosexuality.

² Krauss, F. S., *Sitte und Brauch der Südslaven*, pp. 638-41. Vienna, 1885.

quite in the interest of friendship. A friendship between two of the same sex is generally supposed to be imperilled by the intrusion of one of the opposite sex. For a dowried bride Roman friendships had been known to break.¹ The Areoi, those gay blades of the Pacific, were not allowed to marry, a companion running no risk of having to say, like a college classmate, "since he is married I see nothing of him at all."

Between place-fellowship and kin, conflicts arise. If a Behring Strait Eskimo had relatives on the other side of a war, he would blacken his face with charcoal and stay out of the fight,² a position of neutrality not uncommonly taken by kinsmen when their respective communities go to war. Elsewhere, on the other hand, the kin is called upon to yield to the State control over its members or its right to defend them. Among us, for example, although the man who avenges the rape of his daughter is never brought to justice, he who kills the seducer of his sister enjoys no such immunity.

¹ Cicero, *De Amicitia*, x.

² Nelson, E. W., "The Eskimo about Behring Strait," p. 329, xviii. (1896-7), *Ann. Rep. Bur. Amer. Ethn.*

There is conflict too between place-fellowship and caste. In India members of the same caste in different places may not marry. Nor may a barber casteman go into another village to practise the tonsorial art.¹ Trade-unionism in this country is more independent of place-fellowship. Although asserting itself against the national spirit the immigrant brings with him from abroad,² and in this way an indirect contributor to American nationality, it is itself "un-American" in its demands for class privileges. But covertly, not boldly, like syndicalism. Trade-unionism is a caste movement ignoring nationalism or compromising with it. Socialism still further compromises with nationalism, calling upon the State to suppress a rival caste by taking over itself the capitalist function. But syndicalism is a frankly

¹ Dubois, pp. 22, 63.

² There were in 1906 twenty-six nationalities represented in the coal fields. At first the unions organized by nationality—so hostile were the Lithuanians, for example, to the Poles, the Magyars, to the Slovaks. Now among the United Mine Workers it is not so much a question as to whether a man is Polish or Italian, as whether he is union or non-union. (Huebner, G. G., "The Americanization of the Immigrant," *Annals of the Am. Acad. of Social & Polit. Sci.*, vol. xxvii. (1906), p. 664.)

anti-state movement. It is for craft control of industry against community control.¹ To it the political industrialism of socialism is anathema.

¹ See Macdonald, J. Ramsay, *Syndicalism*. Chicago.

CONCLUSION

CONFLICT between the social categories there has been; but in a far view of social history the categories appear to stand together, moved by a common spirit and set against a common foe. Their spirit is apprehensiveness and intolerance of the unlike and of change; their foe, the evanescent, multiform spirit of personality. Through their classification the gregarious instinct is satisfied in segregated groups, groups of the alike separated from groups unlike. And each category more or less strives to impose its character upon what lies without its natural boundaries. Between them, the categories divide up phenomena much as the Chinese divide up nature into the elements of water, fire, wood, metal, and earth, or as we classified in our childhood in a game called "Twenty Questions," its first question always, "animal, vegetable, or mineral?"

From such a rigid classification the mind as it

matures seeks escape. So a maturing culture struggles against its categories. At first it aims for mobility within them and then, as in these latter days, for freedom away from them. The time comes when it will drop its crude scheme of classification altogether, letting the facts, so to speak, take care of themselves. Thus age and sex, kinship, occupation, neighbourhood will count merely like other facts in life, their fetichistic influence gone. As factors in personality they will have to be reckoned with, but as social barriers they will be negligible. The freest possible contact between personalities will be recognized as the *raison d'être* for society, and to the developing of personal relationships will be turned the energies spent in the past upon blocking and hindering them. No more segregated groups, no more covetous claims through false analogy, no more spheres of influence, for the social categories. And then the categories having no assurances to give to those unafraid of change and tolerant of unlikeness, to those of the veritable new freedom, to the whole-hearted lovers of personality, then the archaic categories will seem but the dreams of a

confused and uneasy sleep, nightmares to be forgotten with the new day. Already the wind of its dawn is astir. It is high time to analyse our dreams; once fully awake, analysing them, recalling them even, may be irksome and distasteful, perhaps impossible.

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